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BEWARE: THE FARM CRISIS rs NOT OVER 
After lingering for years, the farm crisis seems to be receding. Net 
cash farm income and net farm income before inventory adjustment are 
currently forecast to establish nominal dollar records in 1987 (Table 1). 
Furthermore, these two income measures increased at compound annual rates 
of 11.6 and 18.7 percent respectively between 1984 and 1987, a sharp 
contrast with 1978-1984 growth rates of 2.7 and 1.8 percent. In addition, 
farm debt excluding farm households, which totalled $199 billion on 
December 31, 1984, is currently forecast at $158 billion for December 31, 
1987. While some farmers, especially those burdened by heavy debts, 
continue to experience difficult times, current trends point toward a more 
optimistic future. 
However, we believe that, far from suggesting optimism, causes of the 
current situation point to a continuation of the farm crisis. Most 
farmers, agricultural policy makers, and agricultural economists were 
caught off guard by the emergence of a farm crisis during the early 1980s. 
We suggest no one should be caught off guard by its continuance. There-
fore, we address the economic causes of the current optimism, the dif-
ficult times they foretell, and a few of the implications. 
Economic Causes of Financial Improvement 
The interaction of three farm sector economic factors underpins the 
financial improvement of the farm sector. The first is declining expen-
ses. Total expenses decreased from $143 to an estimated $115 billion 
between 1984 and 1986 (Table 1). Reasons include (1) declining prices for 
production inputs, (2) declining interest expense, and (3) declining use 
of inputs. The second factor is government price and income programs. 
Direct government transfer payments to farmers plus net Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC) loans for grains increased from $8 to $20 billion 
between 1984 and 1986 before falling to $14.5 billion in 1987 (Table 1). 
The third factor is profitability of the livestock sector. The ratio of 
livestock and livestock product prices to feed grain and hay prices, an 
indicator of livestock sector profitability, surged from 1.01 in 1984 to 
1.74 during the first seven months of 1987 (Table 1). In contrast, the 
ratio averaged 1.10 over the period 1967-1986. While these three factors 
have exerted primary influence, it is important to note the generally good 
weather since 1984 and a recessionless nonfarm economy. The former is 
important because most of a farmer's profit comes from the last 10 - 20 
percent of normal yields. The latter is important because 54 percent of 
farm family income came off the farm in 1986. 
Financial Improvement and Current Optimism are Temporary 
What does the future hold for the three farm sector economic causes 
of recent financial strength? Production expenses: large decreases in 
planted acreage during 1986 and 1987 have nearly balanced production and 
consumption. The need for additional reductions should, at least, be 
smaller in the future. In addition, during April 1987, prices for 
production inputs were slightly higher than during April 1986. On the 
other hand, interest expense should continue to decline as farm operators 
retire debt. In conclusion, farm expenses may continue to decline, but 
the pace will be substantially slower than between 1984 and 1987. 
Government programs: because the Food Security Act of 1985 permits 
loan rates to decline more than target prices between 1987 and 1990 crop 
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years, the authorized declines in target prices do not necessarily imply 
smaller income payments to farmers. The declines, however, do imply lower 
net income for crop farmers unless supply and demand conditions warrant 
market prices in excess of target prices. The latter is considered 
unlikely by most experts. Since there is considerable discussion of 
freezing loan rates as a means of reducing federal budgetary outlays, loan 
rates are assumed to be frozen at 1987 levels. This also produces a 
conservative estimate of the impact of declining government program 
parameters on farm incomes . Applying the permitted decline in target 
prices for feed grains, wheat, rice, and cotton to actual or estimated 
1987 program parameters (base acres, base yields, set-asides, participa-
tion rates) yields a projected $2. 5 billion decline in deficiency pay-
ments. Since target prices substantially exceed average cost of produc-
tion, the decline will translate largely into lower net farm income. 
The livestock sector: it is reasonable to assume that livestock 
producers will respond to historically high returns by increasing produc-
tion, resulting in declining prices and profitability. To demonstrate the 
potential impact of a return to normal profit levels, the following 
analysis uses 1986 price levels, assumes that demand for livestock and 
livestock products increases by 0.55 percent for a one percent decline in 
prices, and assumes that the ratio of prices for livestock and livestock 
products to prices for feed grain and hay for 1986 (1.41) returns to its 
1967-1986 average of 1.10. The composite price of livestock and livestock 
products will decline 24.7 percent from its 1986 value while quantity con-
sumed, hence production, will increase 13.6 percent. The net result is a 
14 .4 percent decline in cash receipts. In dollar terms. the decline 
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equals $10.4 billion since livestock sector cash receipts are estimated at 
$72 billion for 1986. The only income support provided to the livestock 
sector is the dairy price support program. However, its support price can 
drop by as much as 14 percent by 1990. Thus, most of the projected 
decline in livestock cash receipts will translate into reduced profits. 
To summarize, by the early 1990s net farm income could decline as 
much as $10 - 15 billion from its 1986 level. Note, major changes in farm 
policy or significant production problems either in the U.S. or overseas 
could significantly alter the projected decline. 
Impact of the Projected Farm Income Decline on Farm Financial Stress 
The net present value (NPV) model, a commonly used asset valuation 
technique, prices an asset based on the discounted future net income the 
asset is expected to earn. Factors which affect an asset's value include 
the income earned by the asset the first year it is owned, expected rate 
of change over time in earned income, expected rate of inflation (defla-
tion), real interest rate, and income and capital gains tax rates. 
A characteristic of the NPV model is that a change in income earned 
by an asset during its initial year of ownership results in a propor-
tionate change in the asset's value. The preceding analysis in essence 
estimates a reduction in initial year income because the reduction 
reflects a permanent adjustment to a new economic equilibrium caused by 
reduced government income supports for field crops and the return of the 
livestock sector to normal profit levels. For 1986, income earned by farm 
assets is currently estimated at $31.9 billion. Therefore, a $10 billion 
(about 30 percent) decline in farm income translates through the NPV model 
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to a 30 percent decline in farm asset values. Applying the projected 
decline to the December 31, 1986 value of $692 billion for non-Commodity 
Credit Corporation (CCC), non-farm household assets yields a farm asset 
value of $484 billion. 
The projected decline in farm asset value has important implications 
for farm debt. Estimated debt consistent with a given asset level can be 
obtained by using a debt-asset ratio. The average debt-asset ratio during 
the 1960s and 1970s, 16.1 percent, is used in this analysis. It may be 
too high because recent declines in asset values may make farm investors 
more conservative borrowers than during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Applying this ratio ( 16 .1 percent) to the December 31, 1986 asset 
value of $692 billion yields a farm debt estimate of $112 billion, 
excluding household and CCC debt. USDA' s preliminary estimate for 
December 31, 1987 is $144 billion. Thus, additional debt liquidation is 
likely at current farm asset and income levels. The projected decline in 
farm debt becomes even larger when the debt-asset ratio is applied to the 
projected asset value of $484 billion. The debt estimate becomes $78 
billion, a 46 percent decline from its December 31, 1987 level. 
While the projected decline in farm asset and debt levels is large, 
three factors will moderate the decline and its impacts. First, produc-
tion of the various livestock products will expand at differing rates. 
Historical behavior suggests it will be at least 1989 before normal profit 
levels are reached, and it may be as late as 1991. The second factor is 
that changes in asset values tend to lag changes in the income earned by 
assets. Thus, the projected decline in asset values (and farm debt) could 
take five to ten years to complete. The third consideration is that the 
5 
livestock sector wi 11 account for 60 to 80 percent of the projected 
decline in income. Yet, on December 31, 1985, land comprised 68 percent 
of non-household, non-CCC farm assets. Thus, the decline in farm assets 
will be moderated by the difference between the distribution of projected 
income decline and the distribution of farm assets among the various farm 
subsectors. However, the 1982 Census of Agriculture reveals that farms 
with more than 1000 acres account for 24 percent of livestock receipts, 
and, more broad! y, farms with 260 or more acres earned 63 percent of 
livestock cash receipts. A reasonable assumption concerning current 
economic behavior among farm operators ~ith livestock operations is that 
profits from the livestock operation(s) are being used to support land 
values. Thus, as livestock sector profits decline, ability of these 
operators to support land values will decline. 
Summary, Conclusion and Implications 
The farm crisis of the 1980s probably began in 1978-79. At that 
time, farm income stagnated. Since then, the crisis can be broken into 
two periods. One, from 1978 to 1983, was characterized by stagnant income 
but increasing asset values through 1981 and then a small decline through 
1983. The second, from 1984 to 1986, was one of surging income but 
rapidly declining asset values. Thus, it is not too inaccurate to 
generally characterize the farm crisis as a debt--not income--problem. 
This characterization is reflected in the observation that, despite the 
huge surge in farm income since 1983, the proportion of U.S. farm opera-
tors under the most stress (negative cash flow and debt-asset ratios 
greater than 40%) has only declined from 12-13 percent to 10-11 percent. 
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The current optimism is characterized by record nominal income levels 
and at least stable asset values. However, when the causes of the current 
financial performance are examined, optimism is replaced by foreboding. 
Declining government income supports and increasing production of meat and 
livestock products in response to current profits foretell more hard 
times. 
This analysis is too simplistic to forecast specific numbers, but it 
does suggest farm asset values could decline as much as 20 to 30 percent 
from current values, and farm debt could decline as much as 40-50 percent 
from current values. One implication is that current estimates for 
assistance to the Farm Credit System are too low. Another is that the 
next phase of the farm crisis could be more difficult than the recently-
completed phase. The reason is that both asset value and income will 
decline, implying a much wider impact upon all types of farm operators, 
whatever their debt structure. 
Given the potential for a continuing farm crisis, we believe farmers 
and policy makers should engage in contingency planning. Failure to 
consider the worst while hoping for the best is management by blinders. 
We hope our forecasts do not come true, for the pain will be immense. 
But, to ignore the potential for a continuing crisis is to lose valuable 
time in which to develop a sound course of action. 
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Table 1: Selected Indicators of the Financial Status of Production 




Net Expenses Product 
Net Cash Government Including Prices to 
Farm Farm Payments Farm Feed Grain 
Year Income a Income & Loansb Household & Hay Prices 
- - - - Billion $ - - - - -
1978 23.3 33.1 3.1 103.2 1.23 
1979 22.4 33.4 0.5 123.3 1.29 
1980 22.4 34.2 1. 7 133.1 1.09 
1981 20.4 32.8 5.0 139.4 1.01 
1982 24.9 38.1 12.6 140.0 1.21 
1983 23.6 37.1 8.5 140.4 0.99 
1984 26.0 38.9 7.6 142.7 1.01 
1985 34.8 47.0 19.5 133.7 1.11 
1986° 41.0 53.0 20.1 122.0 1.41d 
1987° 43.5 54.0 14.5 115.0 1.74 
. 
a Net farm income before inventory adjustments. 
b Government payments and loans are the sum of direct government payments to 
farmers plus net Commodity Credit Corporation loans for the year. 
c Net farm income, net cash farm income, production expenses and government 
payments and loans are U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) preliminary 
estimates for 1986 and the midpoint of the forecasted range for 1987. 
d The price ratio is based on the average of prices reported by USDA for 
January through July. 
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